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CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES. Edited by Allan C. Hutchinson. Totowa, 
New Jersey: Rowman & Littlefield. 1989. Pp. vii, 348. Cloth, 
$45.95; paper, $22.50. 
Critical Legal Studies (CLS) is here to stay and, for better or 
worse, with a new anthology edited by Allan Hutchinson, 1 the move-
ment takes an important step: CLS has entered the realm of the text-
book-worthy. From the ever-expanding body of CLS literature, 
Hutchinson selected nineteen pieces as "many people's view of the 
best/most representative/significant/helpful/etc. work in CLS" (p. 
vii). The scholars he includes are Roberto Unger, Duncan Kennedy, 
Catharine MacKinnon, Robert Gordon, Morton Horowitz, Alan 
Freeman, Elizabeth Mensch, Mark Tushnet, Gerald Frug, Clare Dal-
ton, Mark Kelman, Karl Klare, Frances Olsen, Richard Abel, Wil-
liam Simon, Peter Gabel, and Paul Harris. This litany brings together 
many of the most revered figures in CLS, and edited versions of some 
of their most interesting work appear in the collection. Even the most 
well-read CLS disciples are likely to find some great pieces which they 
had previously overlooked.2 
Hutchinson edited and organized the excerpts around topics to 
make them more accessible to the mainstream. 3 In Part I, Toward 
Critical Theory, Hutchinson seeks to introduce the intellectual frame-
work for Critical thinking.4 Part II, Tracking History, then considers 
the CLS approach to legal history in three pieces which criticize the 
preexisting mindset of traditional scholars. 5 In Part III, Confronting 
Contradiction, Hutchinson groups together Kennedy's assertion of the 
"fundamental contradiction" and two other excerpts investigating the 
1. Allan C. Hutchinson is a professor oflaw at Osgoode Hall Law School, Yark University, 
Toronto. Professor Hutchinson is the author of numerous critical pieces and is a self-proclaimed 
proponent of the CLS movement. 
2. This book notice does not intend to add to the endless fray about the value or lack thereof 
in CLS material: no serious legal thinker can continue to ignore the CLS movement. 
3. Because this imposition of structure is conventional and subjective, it would be easy to 
question, but Hutchinson addresses this problem in the preface, calling it "defensible and illumi-
nating." P. vii. 
4. Part I includes three excerpts: Roberto Unger's Liberal Political Theory (attacking tradi-
tional liberalism and suggesting an alternative based on altruism) (pp. 15-35), Duncan Kennedy's 
Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication (exposing the contradiction between individual-
ism and altruism in contemporary legal thought) (pp. 36-55), and Catharine MacKinnon's Femi-
nism, Marxism, Method, and the State: Toward Feminist Jurisprudence (indicting both liberalism 
and Marxism for their failures to address feminist concerns) (pp. 56-76). 
5. The three excerpts are Alan Freeman's Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through An-
tidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine (attacking common notions 
about the civil rights movement) (pp. 120-36), Robert Gordon's Critical Legal Histories (survey-
ing critical approaches to legal history in a broad theoretical framework) (pp. 79-103), and Mor-
ton Horowitz's The Triumph of Contract (challenging prevalent assumptions about the 
development of contract doctrine) (pp. 104-19). 
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ramifications of this theory in practice. 6 Hutchinson's fourth group-
ing, Beyond Rationality, offers alternatives to the Rationalist tradition 
of legal and political philosophy, relying heavily on deconstruction, 
particularly Kelman's version, called "trashing."7 Part V, On Ideol-
ogy, argues the proposition that CLS scholars need to identify and re-
consider the interests on which traditional ideology is based. 8 Finally, 
Part VI, Toward a Critical Practice, offers several proposals for con-
verting CLS theory into actual practical involvement.9 
While the collection's structure and accessibility are merits for a 
textbook, one central concern remains: the very notion of a CLS text-
book raises the specter of institutionalization. The reduction of the 
literature of a radical movement to a mainstream digest poses a real 
threat to the continuing viability of CLS. As Peter Gabel and Duncan 
Kennedy point out, assimilation into the academy can result in CLS 
scholars losing control over their own ideas, especially their radical 
components. 10 To illustrate this, Gabel and Kennedy use a metaphor 
borrowed from the film Invasion of the Body Snatchers. In the cine-
matic version of the metaphor, aliens duplicate human bodies, kill the 
originals, and use the reproductions for alien purposes; in the meta-
phor's CLS context, the members of the legal academy invade radical 
ideas, discard the original conceptions, and recast the arguments to 
6. The "fundamental contradiction" is a central assertion of Duncan Kennedy's work. He 
defines it, in a nutshell, as the assertion that "most participants in American legal culture believe 
that the goal of individual freedom is at the same time dependent on and incompatible with the 
communal coercive action that is necessary to achieve it." P. 139. Hutchinson's Part III in-
cludes an excerpt of the article in which Kennedy proposed it, The Structure of Blackstone's 
Commentaries (pp. 139-47), as well as Mensch's Contract as Ideology (pointing out the contradic-
tions inherent in the principle of "free" contract) (pp. 148-56), and Tushnet's Following The 
Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral Principles (investigating the contra-
dictions inherent in traditional doctrines of constitutional interpretation) (pp. 157-78). 
7. Part IV begins with Gerald Frug's The Ideology of Bureaucracy in American Law, which 
relies heavily on Derrida's deconstructive methods. Pp. 181-94. The deconstructive critique 
continues in Clare Dalton's An Essay in the Deconstruction of Contract Doctrine. Pp. 195-208. 
The third piece, Mark Kelman's Trashing, is the standard articulation of CLS' linguistic and 
philosophical approach of the CLS movement. Pp. 209~25. 
8: The excerpt from Karl Klare's Judicial Deradicalization of the Wagner Act and the Origins 
of Modem Legal Consciousness, 1937-1941 (pp. 229-55) laments the judiciary's failure to respond 
to the radical potential of the labor movement which culminated in the Wagner Act. Frances 
Olsen, in The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform (pp. 256-72), 
investigates the appropriate roles for family-based and market-based approaches in improving 
women's status in society. Lastly, Richard Abel's A Critique of American Tort Law (pp. 273-88) 
applies nee-Marxist theory to tort damage calculations and recommends a socialist response to 
cqnventional methods. 
9. William Simon's Visions of Practice in Legal Thought looks to the traditional visions of the 
legal profession and advocates a more radical level of personal and professional commitment. 
Pp. 292-302. Peter Gabel and Paul Harris offer practical day-to-day methods for empowering 
litigants in Building Power and Breaking Images: Critical Legal Theory and the Practice of Law. 
Pp. 303-22. The collection concludes, as it began, with Unger, and a chapter from his book, The 
Critical Legal Studies Movement. Pp. 323-43. 
10. Gabel & Kennedy, Roll Over Beethoven, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1984). 
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support some mainstream use. 11 If this concern is well founded, 
Hutchinson's anthology might not be a great step forward for the CLS 
movement as much as a means of hastening its institutionalization. 
Perhaps the most disturbing aspect of the book is that Hutchinson 
does not address this issue. Rather than making radical editorial 
moves, he caters to conventional tastes, diluting the radicalism of the 
pieces included and the movement at large. The resulting collection 
not only fails to offer any new approach, but it also omits much of the 
most linguistically and structurally innovative CLS work currently 
available. 12 Yet the final product, an insider's view of the "best" work 
in CLS reduced to an accessible format, cries out to be used as a text-
book in CLS 101. 
Does CLS need such a work to come from its own ranks and with 
the imprimatur of one of its leading proponents? Hutchinson himself 
appears to answer that question in the negative, 13 yet continues the 
project anyway. To make matters worse, his editorial style actually 
ignores primary CLS assertions, contributing further to the anthol-
ogy's institutionalization of the movement. 
For example, one of the major themes running through CLS think-
ing - and many of the works in this collection - is the importance of 
collapsing the distinction between law and other elements of society .14 
According to this tenet, law and society are not separate entities but 
interact constantly and shape each other. Unfortunately, Hutchinson, 
as a by-product of his editorial decisions, reinforces what he purports 
to attack. He gives the legal community a collection consisting almost 
11. Kennedy's solution to "idea snatching'' is to recant his propositions after they have fin-
ished their useful radical lives and before they can be corrupted. By rejecting his own ideas, he 
ensures that their mainsteam corruptions cannot claim the weight of his endorsement. See, e.g., 
id. at 15-17 (recanting the "fundamental contradiction"); cf. Kennedy, supra note 6. 
12. Many CLS writers have tried to change standard conceptions oflegal writing by adopting 
modernist literary techniques. See, e.g., Hutchinson, Indiana Dworkin and the Temple of Doom 
(Book Review), 96 YALE L.J. 637 (1987) (this review of Ronald Dworkin's Law's Empire is an 
example of modernism in Hutchinson's own work); see generally Luban, Legal Modernism, 84 
MlCH. L. REV. 1656 (1986) (advocating that the CLS movement can be considered the legal 
counterpart of the modernist movement in other fields). 
Hutchinson includes no examples of this writing in the collection. Not even Gabel and Ken-
nedy's famous and influential dialogue, Roll Over Beethoven, is included. Gabel & Kennedy, 
supra note 10. Of course it would be difficult to find a place for such work in an anthology like 
Hutchinson's, since Kennedy's comments explicitly reject any attempt at institutionalization. 
13. "CLS must strive to dwell on the threshold [of the pluralistic legal academy]; it must 
decline any invitation to step inside as well as resist the temptation to withdraw to the political 
wilderness of resigned irrelevance." P. 9. Apparently Hutchinson believes that producing a CLS 
treatise is not "stepping inside" the system, but he fails to justify that belief. Hutchinson also 
states: "The difficulty is to develop a professional modus vivendi that works within the system by 
allowing the radical to function as a lawyer, but does not become captive to the very system it 
strives to overcome." P. 289 (Hutchinson's preface to the collection's final section on building a 
critical practice). This collection has become captive to the system in its most fundamental 
approach. 
14. Pp. 95-97 (Gordon, Critical Legal Histories). Actually, the attack may be better charac-
terized: does law exist independently at all, and, if so, in what form? 
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exclusively of law review articles15 written by law professors16 about 
legal thought. This editorial decision hardly serves to blur the law/ 
society distinction and instead validates the elitism which CLS 
challenges. 
Certainly it is possible to imagine alternatives. Hutchinson himself 
lists philosophers, linguists, economists, and other theorists among the 
important influences on the CLS movement.17 Yet the work of these 
scholars does not appear in the collection and there is no justification 
for the omission. If anything; it is probable that the students and 
"legal" scholars most likely to read Hutchinson's collection are less 
familiar with these other important thinkers than with the included 
writers. Juxtaposing Gerald Frug's article with a piece from Jacques 
Derrida would not only make both works richer and more comprehen-
sible, 18 it would also allow the editor to promote the CLS project of 
blurring the distinctions between traditionally different academic dis-
ciplines. Furthermore, potential users without traditional legal train-
ing (in keeping with the Derrida example, perhaps literary theorists) 
could read the collection and see connections between areas of knowl-
edge familiar to them and the critical insights of the legal writers. 
Another disturbing aspect of Hutchinson's editing is the demo-
graphic similarity between the scholars represented in this collection 
and the general makeup of the legal academy. If one goal of the CLS 
movement is to build an unalienated political consciousness by in-
creasing people's understanding of their personal and political power 
(p. 304), the editing of this collection does little to further that goal. 
Of 19 selections, only four are written by women, 19 a particularly 
low number for a movement that prides itself on its anti-discrimina-
tory and empowering philosophy.2° Furthermore, three of these four 
excerpts deal explicitly with family law and the role of women in soci-
15. Of 19 articles, only four are not taken from legal periodicals: Unger's Liberal Political 
Theory, MacKinnon's Feminism, Marxism, Method. and the State: Toward Feminist Jurispru-
dence, Horowitz's The Triumph of Contract, and linger's The Critical Legal Studies Movement. 
Actually, Unger's work appeared in the Harvard Law Review before publication as a book. Only 
MacKinnon's piece, excerpted from Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society, was taken 
from a non-law journal. 
16. Once again, the only exception is Morton Horowitz, a historian so long identified with 
the legal academy as to have all but attained membership in that exclusive group. 
17. Adorno, Horkheimer, Marcuse, Foucault, Derrida, and Habermas are some of the schol· 
ars Hutchinson mentions. P. 10, n.12. Undoubtedly, he could have included many others. 
18. Frug's excerpt relies heavily on Derridean theories of deconstruction and he uses Der· 
rida's term "dangerous supplement" to analyze the relationship between subjectivity and objec-
tivity. P. 186 (citing J. DERRIDA, ON GRAMMATOLOGY 141-64 (1976)). 
19. Dalton, An Essay in the Deconstruction of Contract Doctrine (p. 195); MacKinnon, Femi· 
nism, Marxism, Method, and the State: Toward Feminist Jurisprudence (p. 56); Mensch, Contract 
as Ideology (p. 148); Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform 
(p. 256). 
20. There is a popular conception that most CLS scholars are white male law professors 
teaching at prestigious law schools. Hutchinson does little to dispel that myth: women and 
minorities are poorly represented in this collection. The omission of many important minority 
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ety, traditionally "feminist" topics.21 
The message lurking behind the editing is subtle, yet extremely im-
portant: the major contribution of women to CLS is their feminist 
perspective.22 By this implication, Hutchinson does not offer a pro-
gressive or empowering editorial perspective but merely another form 
of institutionalization. While it is true that most collections contain 
some element of stereotyping, an editor with the mind and radical sen-
sibilities of Allan Hutchinson must be held to a higher standard. 
Hutchinson's editorial work is hardly radical, but this is not to say 
that the resulting collection is not a very good and important book, 
one that is likely to change many readers' perceptions oflaw. Because 
the articles themselves, like much of CLS, need to be read, the book 
easily stands on their strengths alone. Hutchinson, like any editor, 
does make some technical mistakes, but they occasionally create inad-
vertent humor.23 Although Critical Legal Studies does co-opt the 
scholars, including Derrick Bell, Patricia Williams, and Mari Matsuda, to name a few, denigrates 
the value of (and interest in) their work. 
Interestingly, both minority and feminist radicals have attacked much of the CLS program 
for failing to address demographic interests. See, e.g., MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, 
Method, and the State: Toward Feminist Jurisprudence (rejecting nee-Marxist theory as well as 
liberal theory for failing to account for gender concerns adequately). P. 56. Kennedy's recanta-
tion of the critique of rights in Roll Over Beethoven can be seen, in part, as a response to these 
scholars. Gabel & Kennedy, supra note 10, at 36-41. 
21. MacKinnon's Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: Toward Feminist Jurispru-
dence questions the assumptions of mainstream male-oriented thinking; Dalton's An Essay in the 
Deconstruction of Contract Doctrine reassesses cohabitation contracts; and Olsen's The Family 
and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform investigates the appropriate relation 
between market-based and family-based approaches in remedying gender dichotomy. All three 
are first rate, thought-provoking excerpts worthy of inclusion in any collection, but they also 
focus primarily on the role of women in society. Only Mensch's Contract as Ideology represents 
women in CLS writing about topics not traditionally related to gender. 
22. It should be noted that this criticism of the limitation of women scholars to the role of 
feminist is directed at Hutchinson as editor, not at the particular women excerpted. While each 
individual writer freely follows her own views in her work, Hutchinson has chosen, from a vast 
literature of legal scholarship by women, to include a large number of gender-related pieces. 
23. My personal favorites are the mistakes in the very first footnote. Hutchinson not only 
gets the page of the article cited wrong, but also calls Paul Carrington by the name John. P. 10 
(citing Carrington, Of Law and the River, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 222 (1984)). This is particularly 
humorous given Carrington's response to Robert Gordon's letter in correspondence criticizing 
the article cited: "So I can elate a bit [at not being ignored], along with the politicians who ask 
only that their name be spelled co"ectly." Correspondence, "Of Law and the River," and of 
Nihilism and Academic Freedom, 35 J. LEGAL EDUC. 1, 10 (1985) (emphasis added). 
Unfortunately, the reader soon tires of technical mistakes in editing. Hutchinson gives no 
information on the methods he used to choose which footnotes to include, and in some cases the 
omissions are glaring and the inclusions are useless. To make matters worse, the footnotes in-
cluded are sometimes misnumbered and even inconsistent with the numbers in the edited text. 
See, e.g., Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, n.80 (or is it 86?). P. 42. 
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radicalism of the movement, for what it is - a mainstream anthology 
- it serves very well.24 
- Michael F. Colosi 
24. Of course the question remains: whom does it serve? 
